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Abstract: 
The 1992-95 war in Bosnia was the worst war on the European continent since WWII. The 
massive and systematic human rights violations were the worst in Europe since the 
Holocaust. This article proposes, based on a provisional review of non-legal, mainly social 
science and humanities literature on the Yugoslav crisis, and on a focused analysis of 
genocide jurisprudence, that there is a gulf between, on the one hand, academic 
interpretations of these human rights violations as constituting genocide – with some notable 
exceptions - and on the other, judicial decisions regarding cases brought at the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) (and partly the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda - ICTR). A key issue in the determination of genocide has been where 
and when such crimes were committed. There is provisional agreement between academe 
and the law on the case of the massacres at Srebrenica amounting to genocide, but the 
earlier period of the war, in the spring/summer of 1992 in eastern and northern Bosnia, often 
seen by analysts as the key period of systematic and massive violence constituting 
genocide, has been largely avoided or dismissed by the international judicial effort. By 
examining the key case of Jelisic, this article highlights in detail some issues of interpretation 
or misinterpretation in the evolving jurisprudence on genocide. 
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Introduction 
The war in Bosnia represented the worst case of massive and systematic human rights 
violations in Europe since WWII. How international actors responded to the challenge the 
breakup of Yugoslavia posed has been widely discussed and studied with a strong sense 
coming out of the literature that international efforts, on the whole, failed. The UN, tasked 
with peace-keeping in a war zone, was arguably doomed to failure by its guiding masters on 
the Security Council. But its failures, from failing to protect besieged and threatened civilians 
while protecting and delivering to them humanitarian aid, to having no answer to the attack 
on the UN Safe Area of Srebrenica  despite NATO preparedness to take action, have been 
rightly in part recognised by itself and accepted.2 Individual major state actors, most notably 
France and especially Britain displayed a ‘pusillanimous realism’ which helped to stymie 
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efforts to take more effective action. The US, if we can forgive the anachronism, ‘led from 
behind’ having offered the rising EU the chance to solve a crisis in its own backyard. 
 
The manner in which the wars were reported by international media, according to at least 
two important studies, had a significant influence on policy reaction to these atrocities, 
limiting understanding of both politicians and publics, creating confusion about a case of 
aggression, war and genocide.3 The focus of this article is not, however, these institutions; 
rather it examines in a comparative manner, how non-state elements – on the one hand 
international legal actors, primarily the tribunal established by the Security Council as a 
concrete response to the atrocities in the wars, and on the other, academic actors located in 
civil society institutions such as universities and think tanks – tackled the vexed issue of 
responsibility for the crime of genocide. 
 
Academia was no doubt affected by the labelling choices, false balancing and other features 
of the reporting of the wars but it seems to be the case that those who looked closely at the 
crisis in their work, whether as historians, area specialists, genocide theorists or war and 
policy experts, better understood events than most other professionals.4 Can the same be 
said of the law? Specifically how have the international judiciary tasked with trying those 
accused of war crimes and genocide understood the crisis and how has this affected their 
judgments? There has been considerable discord sown in the Balkans over a number of the 
Tribunal’s judgements, most recently in Serbia over the Gotovina case.5 
 
This article is not meant to be read as a harsh critique of the ICTY itself – much has been 
accomplished through its formation and operation and it would be hard to imagine the region 
as stable and relatively prosperous as it is today without its difficult and challenging case 
work. That said, here we focus on the most serious crime, genocide, considering the record 
of the main judicial bodies and contrasting this with academic perspectives. The discussion 
moves to an analysis of the key aspects of an important case, Jelisic, in relation to what the 
author identifies as omissions in the judicial reckoning provided by, in particular, the 
Yugoslav Tribunal (ICTY): the failure to convict the direct perpetrators of the crimes which 
constitute the actus reus of genocide, and the failure to recognise genocide as having taken 
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place outside of the municipality of Srebrenica.6 Underpinning this critique the article offers a 
brief summary history of one of the early episodes of the war which convinced many 
international observers of the essentially genocidal nature of the conflict. 
 
The aim of this article therefore is to raise legal issues of inconsistency drawing on the 
author’s own knowledge of the conflict, developed as a journalist and academic prior to, 
during and after the crisis and from previous legal research and dissenting judicial opinion. 
 
1 War and Genocide in Bosnia? 
In a sense, Yugoslavia, in particular Bosnia, wrong-footed international actors. During the 
Cold War, atrocities had been carried out, but strategic imperatives meant the media rarely 
took an independent line and fully reported major war crimes and human rights atrocities.7 
The delayed recognition of the widespread failure of member states and the UN system is 
amply demonstrated by Kofi Annan’s depiction of the actual nature of the crisis, never 
expressed at the time, in the UN’s own scathing report on the Bosnia crisis: 
 
 As part of the larger ambition for a “Greater Serbia”, the Bosnian Serbs set out to 
 occupy the territory of the enclaves... The civilian inhabitants of the enclaves were 
 not the incidental victims of the attackers; their death or removal was the very 
 purpose of the attacks upon them. The tactic of employing savage terror, primarily 
 mass killings, rapes and brutalization of civilians, to expel populations was used to 
 the greatest extent in Bosnia and Hercegovina...8 
 
The war in Bosnia, the third conflict (after Slovenia and Croatia) in the Yugoslav breakup, 
surpassed all expectations of brutality and predictions of carnage. It was ‘more discussed 
and analysed on almost all levels while it was still in train than any other conflict.’9 As a result 
of such saturated exposure the war scored itself on European and wider global 
consciousness like no other.10 But as one historian has remarked, the crisis remains 
‘undoubtedly one of the most misunderstood of modern history.’11 This raises an obvious 
question: 
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One might ask what there could be to misunderstand in the sickening brutality and 
appalling suffering of the above mentioned stories. There may have been a universal 
comprehension of suffering but in moving beyond the fundamental, to more specific 
issues of causation and responsibility, and more precise definition of the nature of the 
war, a debate began in which the most basic language was contested. This is the 
paradox of the representation of the Bosnian war. Its product appears to have been 
sympathy with regard to mediated suffering but at the same time, confusion in 
relation to most meaningful questions about the war.12 
  
A fundamental question of the war relates to the methods used by Belgrade-backed forces in 
the conflict. Arguably most Bosnians and a majority of scholars on the issue understand the 
fundamental feature of the conflict to be its genocidal character.13 Specifically the systematic 
and organised attack on Bosnian civilians by Serbian forces merits the descriptor genocide. 
The author takes the view, as many of the international judiciary concur, that the systematic 
nature of the attacks provides compelling evidence of the intent to destroy.14 This research 
focuses on the perceived gap between historical and social scientific analyses of war and 
genocide on the one hand, and law and its interpretation - mainly at the ad hoc International 
Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia (ICTY) – on the other. Such a gap must in part be 
seen as a product not purely of the institutional imperatives and discourses that dominated in 
the period but also of a wider cultural understanding of genocide which perhaps already has 
faded from view. Genocide is a term that in the early 1990s seemed to belong to an earlier 
period, the era of WWII and the Holocaust. Indeed scholars have identified a school of 
thought which proposes ‘Holocaust exclusivity’ or ‘uniqueness’.  Jurisprudence on genocide 
has developed considerably since the formation of the ad hoc tribunals in response to the 
Yugoslav and Rwandan crises, there having been little test of the Genocide Convention until 
the commencement of cases at these two tribunals in 1997.  
 
Underlying this research is a question about the ability of those who interpret law regarding 
what most consider to be the ‘crime of crimes’, mainly international criminal judges, to 
remain beyond influence of media representations in the societies in which we all  live and 
work. Like academics, judges are presumed to analyse evidence in a detached manner, 
methodically and in great detail. There is no doubt an expectation that the international 
judiciary would conduct its work largely free from the influence of the media. Such a 
presumption may be overly optimistic. This is not a study however of how judges ‘receive’ 
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and interpret media messages but it has a more modest aim of raising questions about the 
interpretation of law relating to genocide in Bosnia given the apparent mismatch between 
judicial findings regarding genocide at the ICTY and the views of many, arguably most, 
Balkans history scholars, war and strategic studies academics, policy experts, and genocide 
theorists.15 This difference is important because such a gulf between the perspectives of 
elements of the international judiciary and relevant experts (let alone individual members of 
the societies to which these judgments pertain) could undermine the legitimacy of 
international criminal justice in the long term. 
 
Social scientists and humanities scholars have written extensively about the Bosnia crisis. 
Martin Shaw, a leading genocide scholar, argued in the mid-1990s that Serbian actions in 
Bosnia amounted to genocide, a position shared by most scholars in this field.16 Norman 
Cigar, a military analyst, author of ‘Genocide in Bosnia’, described the specific nature of the 
attacks and ideology of ethnic purity underpinning Serbian actions.17 The US critical 
sociologist, Stjepan Mestrovic, described a ‘postemotional’ genocide in Bosnia.18 
Philosophers including Jean Baudrillard and Alain Finkelkraut and especially Bernard Henri 
Levi argued with some passion for the crisis to be understood in these terms.19 The Balkans 
historian Marko Hoare has argued trenchantly against the narrow interpretation of the 
Genocide Convention by ICTY judges.20 Other scholars, including the historians Brendan 
Simms and Noel Malcolm and the war analysts Jane Sharp and James Gow, implicitly 
support such an understanding of the nature of the conflict. Others from a range of 
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disciplines have taken the view that Serbia and its proxies, did indeed attempt, and partly 
succeeded in carrying out an expansionist project underpinned by genocidal methods.21  
 
Despite the critique of the media suggested above, many journalists led the development of 
this understanding of the crisis as genocide.22 Through reports on the Omarska camp by Ed 
Vulliamy, Penny Marshall and Ian Williams, the tireless campaigning journalism of Maggie 
O’Kane and especially the contribution of Roy Gutman (author of ‘Witness to Genocide’) who 
led the way in the spring and early summer of 1992 in describing the massacres and mass 
forced deportation of Bosnians as genocide, genocide was certainly represented in the 
media by some reporters. Chuck Sudetic, David Rieff and David Rohde,  developed similar 
portrayals of events during 1992-95. 
 
Law, or at least the international judiciary which staffs the ICTY, it is argued here, is to some 
extent out of step with the Bosnian victims and with many western journalists who became 
involved in the reporting of the wars during its over three and a half years of violence. What 
then, has been the record to date, of the international effort to prosecute the crime of 
genocide at the ICTY?  
 
Four mid-to-senior level army officers have been convicted of genocide or genocide related 
crimes. Drina Corps Commander during the Srebrenica massacres, General-Major Radislav 
Krstic, was the first person to be convicted of genocide at the ICTY, the first in Europe in 
fact. On appeal his sentence was reduced from 46 to 35 years having been found guilty of 
the lesser charge of aiding and abetting genocide. Drago Nikolic, a Second Lieutenant was 
also found guilty of this form of responsibility for genocide. Ljubisa Beara, Head of Security 
of the Army of Republika Srpska (VRS) Main Staff and Vujadin Popovic, Lieutenant-Colonel, 
have been found guilty of genocide and conspiracy to commit genocide, again relating to 
Srebrenica in July 1995. Eleven of the 1523 genocide indictees escaped conviction; two 
(Milosevic and Kovacevic) died before completion of trials, three (Nikolic, Obrenovic and 
Plavsic) engaged in plea-bargaining, each settling for a crimes against humanity conviction, 
three indictees  relating to Srebrenica (Blagojevic, Pandurevic and Borovcanin) were found 
not guilty. Three were found not guilty (Jelisic, Krajisnik and Stakic) relating to northern and 
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eastern Bosnian massacres at earlier periods of the conflict.24 Bosnians have been 
‘disappointed in the Tribunal’s failure to sustain genocide-related charges in the few cases 
where genocide was charged and which resulted in a verdict.’25 
 
The aim of this article as noted above is to raise legal issues of inconsistency. As already 
noted, most serious scholars argue that genocide occurred in Bosnia but so far only four 
men have been convicted of that crime at The Hague, and only for crimes specifically 
relating to the series of massacres at Srebrenica in July 1995. As one legal scholar has 
proposed, the emerging doctrine of the ICTY ‘risks undermining the object and purpose of 
the Genocide Convention’.26  
 
A key issue in the genocide identified by Bosnian writers and international experts is the 
legal focus on Srebrenica as the single moment of genocide compared to other atrocities 
committed at early times in other regions of Bosnia. As Emir Suljagic argues: ‘This whole 
thing started as genocide in Bosnia and it ended with genocide in Srebrenica and it’s so 
unfair to those tens of thousands of people who were slaughtered by Serbian forces early in 
the war’.27 As Diane Orentlicher put it, ‘their extermination is left outside the ICTY’s [first] 
judgment of genocide in Krstic’ and the same can be said of the other recent genocide 
judgments.28 Hoare makes a similar point in his critique of Tribunal indictments policy.29 He 
notes that the ICTY and ICJ acknowledged the Belgrade-controlled Yugoslav People’s Army 
directly commanded all Serbian forces operating in Bosnia until 19 May 1992. Given that 
most of the atrocities in the war were carried out in the spring and early summer of 1992, 
Belgrade ‘was directly responsible for the largest phase of mass killing’ in the war.30 Indeed 
the ICJ acknowledged that Serbian forces were in 1992, ‘guilty of systematic massive killings 
and massive mistreatment of the Bosnian Muslims that bore all the characteristics of 
genocide – except that genocidal intent had not been proven.’31 The pattern of killing, 
involving the murder of thousands of civilians, massive forcible deportation and cultural 
destruction was not sufficient to prove genocidal intent in the judgment of the ICTY judiciary. 
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To date no complete historical narrative of the events of the opening weeks of the genocide 
in eastern Bosnia exists. Below, for readers not familiar with the nature of these events, an 
edited summary of such a history is provided using a range of sources including testimony 
from survivors compiled by human rights NGOs, journalists and photographers.32 So what 
was the nature of the attack on Bosnia?33 The account below demonstrates that the attack 
on Eastern Bosnia was systematic and massive. It had, therefore, to have been organised, 
that is planned in advance. Such characteristics demonstrate a strong sense of intentionality 
that the judges at the ICTY seem to have ignored. 
 
2 Eastern Bosnia, April-May 1992 
Despite the region’s non-Serb Bosnian majority and the intermingled nature of society there, 
the people of eastern Bosnia were the first in Bosnia to experience the genocidal assault of 
Belgrade-backed forces determined on radically transforming the demography of the region. 
Human Rights Watch produced a summary that documented a fraction of the picture in 
August 1992. It reported that ‘civilians are being summarily executed as part of an “ethnic 
cleansing” campaign which is being implemented by Serbian forces.’34 In Bijeljina on 1 April, 
 
a gang of Serb gunmen led by a contract killer for Milosevic’s police ministry raced 
across the border from Serbia and attacked Bijeljina. Burly gunmen in black 
balaclavas and jackboots stomped through Bijeljina... [they] went from house to 
house searching out and executing Muslims with education, influence or money. 
Young Muslim men were dragged from their homes, shot in the head, and left to rot 
in the streets. Old women were killed inside their homes.35  
 
There were two significant features about this attack. Firstly, non-local Serbian forces 
deliberately polarised the situation; secondly a strategy of terror in ‘which rumour was as 
important as actual murder’ began in this town.36 
 
On 4 April Serbian forces began shelling the village of Jelec. After three days they entered 
and began killing men, women and children. On 6 April Serbian forces targeted Visegrad but 
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the slaughter there began in earnest in May. Serbian forces soon moved on nearby Foca, 
the military take-over began on 7 April:  
 
the take-over was a co-ordinated effort between Serb irregulars from Serbia proper 
and Montenegro, and paramilitary forces of [Serbs from Bosnia] ... What took place in 
the Foca municipality after the Bosnian Serbs were firmly in control was beyond 
anyone’s worst nightmare... they began rounding up all non-Serb civilians from the 
surrounding villages, separating the men from the women, and imprisoning them in 
numerous detention facilities. The Foca police worked closely with the Serb military 
forces occupying the municipality and played primary and direct roles in the arrest, 
expulsion, detention, rape, torture, and murder of the non-Serb population of the 
town.37 
 
According to the ICRC at least 588 non-Serbs are missing from the Foca municipality and 
the ICTY has publicly indicted nine individuals for rape as a war crime and genocide.38 
 
The following day Belgrade-backed units massed outside of the town of Zvornik. They began 
shelling the Serb minority town of 80,000 without pretext.39 The UNHCR’s most senior official 
in Yugoslavia had to pass through the town in order to get back to Sarajevo. This is what he 
saw:  
 
I was detained for two hours. I realized I was at serious risk. I could see trucks full of 
dead bodies. I could see militiamen taking more corpses of children, women and old 
people from their houses and putting them on trucks. I saw at least four or five trucks 
full of corpses. When I arrived the cleansing had been done. They were looting, 
cleaning up the city after the massacre. I was convinced they were going to kill me.40  
 
The official was Jose-Maria Mendiluce. He later told more of the story:  
 
I saw kids put under the treads of tanks, placed under there by grown men, and then 
run over by other grown men…  Everywhere people were shooting. The fighters were 
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moving through the town, systematically killing all the Muslims they could get their 
hands on.41  
 
He was released and further from the town he found those who had survived this onslaught: 
5,000 people sheltering in a narrow valley.  
 
When I arrived in the car I was surrounded by 1,000 people. They were all over me, 
begging “Save us! Save us!” with such despair that I stayed there for an hour trying 
to calm them down. There were lots of dead people, wounded children on the floor 
looking terrified - absolutely terrified - and we could hear the sound of mortar fire 
approaching.42  
 
These terrible events were described as genocide at the time by Bosnian President 
Izetbegovic who called on the international community to intervene.43 The Bosnian 
Commission for Missing Persons later discovered 69 bodies in Grbavci. They were thought 
to be part of a group of 750 Bosnians from the eastern town of Zvornik who were taken by 
Serbian forces and killed in the nearby village of Karakaj in June 1992.44 
 
The slaughter escalated in May. A UN memorandum which surfaced only on 7 August 1992 
showed that UN peacekeepers had uncovered a ‘calculated strategy’ by Serbian militias of 
summary executions of Muslims, deportations, shootings and house burnings. The 
document, dated 8 July, reported the policy intensified at the start of May.45 During the attack 
on the village of Kosman on 4 May, men were taken away and never seen again, a house 
was packed with people from three families and burned to the ground. The remaining 
houses were burned to the ground. On May 7 the village of Skelani fell to Serbian forces. 
Vahida Selimovic spent the night in her basement. The following day:  
 
The Cetniks surrounded [the remaining non-Serb] houses and tank and mortar shells 
were fired at the homes. There were seven men, four women and 11 children hiding 
in our basement but the Cetniks found us and shot and killed all the men in front of 
us, including our husbands. Then they cursed us, called us Turks and threatened to 
kill us.46  
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In Skelani and Brezovo Polje people were taken from the village and never returned.47 Until 
16 May in Brcko, which was first attacked on 1 May, and taken over soon after, Serbian 
forces ‘killed twenty-five to thirty people every night.’ Out of 1,500 prisoners only 120 left 
alive, according to one of the survivors.48 Lane and Shanker have observed that in late 
spring and early summer 1992, 3,000 Muslims in Brcko were murdered and that the US 
government ‘had pictures of people on trucks, before and after’ at burial sites near to the 
town.49 
 
Much of the population of Visegrad fled when a column of Yugoslav Peoples’ Army (JNA) 
troops and weaponry entered the town in early April. When the troops withdrew in May, local 
Serbian forces took over the municipal government. Paramilitary troops, police and local 
Serbian forces then began a brutal campaign of ‘ethnic cleansing’, according to the ICTY 
indictment. The destruction of the Muslim Bosnians actually began on 20 May. Hundreds of 
civilians were killed in random shootings. Every day, men, women and children were killed 
on a famous bridge spanning the Drina and their bodies were dumped into the river. ‘Serb 
soldiers raped many women and beat and terrorised non-Serb civilians… Widespread 
looting and destruction of non-Serb homes and property took place daily and the two… 
mosques in town were destroyed,’ the indictment reads. Prosecutors claim the Lukic cousins 
and Vasiljevic, on at least two occasions in June 1992, ‘committed, planned, instigated, 
ordered, or otherwise aided and abetted the mass murder of approximately 135 Bosnian 
Muslim civilians.’50 The killing went on for over two months: ‘So many rotting bodies came 
floating down the river that Serb men in Bajina Basta gave up trout fishing in the river for the 
next three summers.’ Out of approximately 12,000 Bosnians who had inhabited Visegrad 
before the war about to 2,000 had been murdered. The rest had ‘wound up in refugee camps 
throughout Europe and Turkey or were eking out an existence in Gorazde, Zepa, Sarajevo 
and other Bosnian towns and villages’.51 Helsinki Watch interviewed survivors from 
Zaklopaca on June 5, 1992. Out of a population of approximately 200 people on ‘May 16, 
1992, at least 83 Muslims were summarily executed by Serbian paramilitaries.’52 In early 
May Serbian forces searched the village for weapons but found nothing.  
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Helsinki reported that it had ‘received reports that similar mass executions have occurred in 
the towns of Bijeljina, Foca, Visegrad and Bratunac ... [It] also is concerned that Serbs 
opposed to such methods of “ethnic cleansing” may also have been executed for treason by 
Serbian forces.’53 On 27 May Marcus Tanner in The Independent reported that in ‘Muslim 
towns seized by the Serbian forces, massacres and forced expulsions have taken place.’ He 
added that Liberation’s Jean Hatzfeld who travelled through the village of Nova Kasaba, 
near Zvornik, in eastern Bosnia earlier that week, had spoken of ‘the bodies of 29 Muslims 
lying on the roadside, shot by Serbs in an execution.’54  
 
In late May houses were destroyed and people murdered in the Muslim Bosnian villages of 
Zlatnik, Turjak, Zanozje and Smrijecj: ‘In one incident six women were burned alive in one 
house. The Celik family was killed in the same way.’55 Before the end of May non-Serb 
houses in the village of Kosterjerevo, near Zvornik were looted and burned and men and 
boys from that village and nearby Drinjaca were massacred. Women were raped and 
abused. People from the non-Serb villages of Sestici, Klisa, Djulici, Sjenokos, Kaludran, 
Celismanu, Lupe, and Bijeli Potok were almost certainly murdered in or near to the Serbian 
concentration camp at Karakaj near Zvornik from 1 to 10 June.56 Le Monde’s Yves Heller, 
reported on 10 June the testimony of Aida Hodic, aged 63, about a massacre that had taken 
place shortly before:  
It was five in the afternoon when the policemen, accompanied by militia reservists, 
got out of their cars and started firing. Half an hour later a hundred and fifty villagers 
were dead or dying in pools of their own blood… the corpses of men, women and 
children lay where they had fallen for three days, until the Serbs buried them in a 
common grave.57 
 
The systematic nature of these massacres - occurring continuously over a period of a few 
months - is beyond question. It is clear too that usually no opposing forces were fighting 
against Serbian forces in these towns and villages. The attacks were meant to drive non-
Serbs from their homes and to destroy their villages.58 There were no comparable acts 
against Serb populations in Bosnia prior to these events, or indeed, outside of isolated acts, 
afterwards. 
 
The evidence presented above suggests that a significant proportion of the people of many 
small towns and villages were massacred or taken to another place to be killed. The work of 
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Daniel Toljaga, based primarily on ICTY case judgments, suggests some 296 predominantly 
Bosnian (Muslim) villages in the region around Srebrenica (i.e., not the whole eastern Bosnia 
region) with at least 3,166 documented deaths, many victims being women, children or 
elderly.59 
 
3 The Case of Jelisic 
One case that seems emblematic of the ICTY’s failure to indict, prosecute and convict 
perpetrators of genocide is the Jelisic case which is examined in more detail below. The 
case has significance because it appears to many, both legal and non-legal academics, and 
some judges, as about as clear-cut a case could ever be. 
 
During May and June 1992 in the north-eastern Bosnian town and municipality of Brcko, 
Goran Jelisic, under the authority of the local police force, itself controlled by Serbian forces, 
committed a series of murders – he admitted to 13 - as well as other inhumane acts, as 
crimes against humanity (with similar crimes under the laws or customs of war). As the ICTY 
summarizes: ‘He systematically killed Muslim detainees at the Laser Bus Co., the Brčko 
police station and the Luka camp’.60 He held a position of authority at Luka camp, a 
makeshift prison facility in the town. As one legal scholar has recognised, Jelisic, ‘stands for 
the uncomfortable proposition that a man who publicly stated that he wanted to kill all 
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Muslims did not have the necessary mens rea to convict for genocide’.61 It is important to 
add a further factor in selection of this case for our attention: Jelisic was the first case to test 
the proposition that one of the foot-soldiers of genocide could be guilty of that crime. After 
Jelisic, there would be little point in the Tribunal Prosecutor indicting other low level but 
serious war criminals for genocide. In that sense, Jelisic represents a test case for genocide 
in several ways. For these reasons this case is the main focus of inquiry here, though other 
cases, where relevant are used. The overwhelmingly important focus here, however, is the 
question of intent. The Genocide Convention, Article II, states: 
In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with 
intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as 
such 
(a) Killing members of the group;  
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; 
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its 
physical destruction in whole or in part; 
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; 
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.  
 
Beginning with the Rwanda Tribunal, the development of the requirement for ‘special intent’ 
for genocide soon became established. It is argued below that this higher level requisite –
special intent instead of mere intent - made it more difficult to convict the so-called ‘small 
fish’ such as Jelisic and others. The level of confusion created by the adoption of this test 
could be seen as damaging to the reputation of the Tribunal as argued by Akhavan.62 The 
analysis then moves to evidential issues related to special intent. Here it is argued, by 
comparison between the evidential basis for intent in Rwanda cases and that cited in the 
judgment in Jelisic, that there is inconsistency in the interpretation of that evidence between 
the tribunals.  
 
In the following section the issue of ‘lone-perpetrator’ genocide is examined. The main point 
of analysis relates to the existence of a plan to destroy the ‘Muslims’ of Brcko and whether 
Jelisic knew of such a plan, or as the judges in the case suggested, did the accused commit 
crimes as a ‘lone-perpetrator’. The notion that in a context such as the Bosnia conflict an 
individual could separate themselves from the context might seem fanciful to many experts 
in the field. With tight military control of all movements in the zone of genocide, strong media 
propaganda ‘informing’ and directing action against the target group, the scope for 
‘individual’ action, without knowledge of wider actions of state and society into which the 
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individual is embedded, appears miniscule. Equally the idea, in Bosnia at least, that a plan of 
action directed at the destruction of non-Serb groups needed further evidence to be proven 
beyond all reasonable doubt, would surprise most academic analysts. Final consideration is 
given to the judgment in the Jelisic case regarding what constitutes part. Here it is 
demonstrated how ‘part’ as per the Convention has become something quite beyond that 
text and beyond the intention of the drafters. Comparisons are made here with the one ICTY 
ruling that genocide took place, in Srebrenica. 
 
An important legal development of the ICTR, was the establishment of the requirement for 
‘special intent’. The distinction of the crime of genocide lay not in entire destruction of a 
group, according to the court, but rather in the requirement that it embodies dolus specialis, 
that is a special intent, ‘required as a constitutive element of the crime, which demands that 
the perpetrator clearly seeks to produce the act charged’.63 This is an important issue 
because, according to Akhavan, it ‘requires that the perpetrator “means to cause” a certain 
consequence “or is aware that it will occur in the ordinary course of events”, whereas special 
intent requires that the perpetrator “clearly intended the result”’.64  ICTR Trial Chambers 
have displayed a level of confusion about special and general intent: In Akayesu, for 
instance, the Chamber explained dolus specialis as meaning that ‘the offender is culpable 
because he knew or should have known that the act committed would destroy, in whole or in 
part, a group’.65 The ‘knew or should have known’ test is manifestly at variance with the 
‘clearly intended the result’ test set forth by the Chamber elsewhere in the Judgment.66 In 
Akhavan’s view, the Rwanda Tribunal has not fully explored this ‘qualitative hierarchy of 
intent’.67 Schabas registers criticism of this development too.68 Greenawalt argues that 
victims are ‘already... singled out on the basis of their group membership’ such that the 
‘requirement that broader group destruction be a desired rather than foreseen consequence 
may be overly strict’.69 He proposes that:  
 In cases where a perpetrator is otherwise liable for a genocidal act,  
 the requirement of genocidal intent should be satisfied if the perpetrator  
 acted in furtherance of a campaign targeting members of a protected  
 group and knew that the goal or manifest effect of the campaign was  
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 the destruction of the group in whole or in part’.70  
 
 This research also notes inconsistencies relating to Trial Chamber judgments regarding 
evidential questions with regard to special intent. While there is not space to fully consider 
these here, a brief comparison of the evidential basis for intent coming out of the Rwanda 
Tribunal and those cited in Jelisic is revealing. In the Akayesu case the Chamber found that: 
acts of violence committed in Rwanda with the intent to destroy the Tutsi population 
is evident not only from the testimony cited above of [various international experts] 
but also from the witnesses who testified with regard to events in the commune of 
Taba.  
 
Witness JJ for example, whose home had been destroyed and whom herself had been 
driven away, had testified that a man sent by the bourgmestre had said he had been sent ‘so 
that no Tutsi would remain on the hill that night’.71 Other quite similar examples taken from 
other witnesses’ (OO and V) testimonies led the court to conclude beyond reasonable doubt 
that acts of violence which took place in Rwanda at this time were ‘committed with intent to 
destroy the Tutsi population’ and that the acts of violence which were carried out in Taba 
during the period were part of this effort.72 Jelisic’s stated intentions during the period in 
which he murdered many Bosnians, seem even more convincing as to that perpetrator’s 
‘genocidal’ or ‘specific’ intent to destroy the group, as the two tribunals have ruled to be the 
test. Jelisic, a witness testified, said to the detainees at Luka camp that between five and ten 
percent would leave, in other words, 90 to 95 percent would be killed. Another testified that 
he said similarly – but using a different formulation – that 70 percent would be executed, 
most of the remainder badly beaten (presumably in the knowledge that many died in brutal 
assaults).73 To another he stated that he hated Muslims and wanted to kill them all. Those 
who managed to survive would be slaves for whom the worst menial tasks would be 
reserved. Muslim women were considered filthy and should be sterilised in Jelisic’s view. At 
this time he also boasted of having killed scores of Bosnians.74 Such statements were 
dismissed by the bench in Jelisic as not constituting evidence of special intent. Whereas 
witness JJ’s statement above leaves the possible interpretation that the Tutsi might one day 
return, Jelisic’s statements – the validity of the evidence was not questioned by the judges - 
can more readily be seen as an expression of a state of mind bent on never allowing 
Bosnians to return as the vast majority would have perished. 
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The ICTY in Jelisic raised, perhaps spuriously, the issue of so-called ‘lone-perpetrator’ 
genocide. In fact Jelisic was a test for the idea that the direct perpetrators of genocide or the 
foot-soldiers of genocide can bear criminal responsibility. In Jelisic the Chamber focused on 
the existence of a plan to destroy in part the ‘Muslims’ of Brcko and whether Jelisic knew of 
such a plan, or as the judges in the case suggested, did the accused commit his murders as 
a lone-perpetrator? This was a simple question to answer – one that the Appeals Chamber 
responded to appropriately.75 
 
As noted above, to the historian, sociologist or political analyst of this conflict a likely 
question would be: could any individual separate themselves from the context of war and 
massacre in Bosnia? With tight military control of all movements in the zone of genocide, 
strong media propaganda ‘informing’ and directing action against the target group, the scope 
for such ‘lone’ perpetration, without knowledge of wider actions of state and society into 
which the individual is embedded, appears miniscule.76 Equally the idea, in Bosnia at least, 
that a plan of action directed at the destruction of non-Serb groups needed further evidence 
to be proven beyond all reasonable doubt seems farcical to the victims and equally far-
fetched to academic experts. Appeal judges concluded that this kind of evidence ‘could have 
provided the basis for a reasonable Chamber to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
respondent had the intent to destroy the Muslim group in Brcko’.77 In other words, this 
evidence was deemed capable in itself of demonstrating the required intent, it being, on this 
evidence, beyond reasonable doubt that genocidal intent was not present in Jelisic at the 
time of the murders he committed.  One dissenting judge argued that evidence of systematic 
and organised killing – a refrigerated lorry removing 10 to 20 bodies a day - needed to be 
taken in conjunction with evidence that most of those killed belonged to a particular ethnic 
group against which Jelisic had discriminatory intent.78 
 
In the Rwanda cases the huge numbers slaughtered made it unnecessary for the court to 
dwell too long on whether the requirement under the Convention of part of the group had 
been met. In Bosnia, the issue was it could be argued, the key issue, and is probably the 
ICTY’s major contribution to genocide jurisprudence.  Today ‘part’ as per the Convention has 
become something quite beyond that text and arguably beyond the intention of the drafters. 
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The question of whether it is possible to establish that there was a special intention to 
destroy a group in part is examined below comparing the statements of intent in Jelisic (as 
noted above) with what was considered ‘part’ of the protected group in the first case to 
attribute responsibility for genocide in Bosnia:  Krstic.79 
 
In Kayishema, the notion of at least a substantial part developed. The judges ruled that ‘in 
part’ implied ‘a reasonably significant number, relative to the total of the group as a whole, or 
else a significant section of a group such as its leadership. Hence, both proportionate scale 
and total number are relevant’.80 Given the imperative of ensuring that the crime of genocide 
is not debased or devalued, this ruling is difficult to contest in terms of the proportion in 
question. But with regard to intent, the tribunal in Jelisic saw ‘in part’ as either ‘desiring the 
extermination of a very large number of the members of the group’ or ‘the desired 
destruction of a more limited number of persons selected for the impact that their 
disappearance would have upon the survival of the group’,81 - the quantitative or qualitative 
tests, respectively.82 Both of these elements, in the view of this author having reviewed the 
facts, were satisfied. The reader will note that the Convention mentions neither ‘significant’ 
or ‘substantial’; nonetheless in Jelisic judges considered intent would be demonstrated by 
destruction of ‘either a major part of the group or a representative fraction thereof, such as 
its leaders’.83 According to the bench ‘a large majority of the group in question’84 where 
substantial normally means ‘of ample or considerable amount or size; sizeable, fairly large’.85 
Significant portion – commonly understood to mean ‘important, notable; consequential’86, 
was over-interpreted as a ‘major’ part. Viewing the ICTR as going ‘even further by 
demanding that the accused have the intention of destroying a “considerable” number of 
individual members of a group’87 the judges seem to compound the error, as this term, also 
not from the Convention, suggests something ‘notable... worthy of consideration or regard; of  
consequence.. [or] worthy of consideration by reason of magnitude; somewhat large in 
amount, extent, duration etc; a good deal of’,88 rather distinct from a major part, i.e., a 
majority.  
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In Krstic it was decided that, ‘the intent to kill all the Bosnian Muslim men of military age in 
Srebrenica constitutes an intent to destroy in part the Bosnian Muslim group within the 
meaning of Article 4 and therefore must be qualified as a genocide’.89 By killing all the 
military aged men, the Bosnian Serb forces effectively destroyed the community of the 
Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica as such and eliminated all likelihood that it could ever re-
establish itself on that territory.90 It seems the judges erred here not in assuming that ‘killing 
all the military aged men’ displayed an intention to destroy the wider group but in assuming 
7,500 out of 20,000 (i.e., the men at Srebrenica) rather than 7,500 out of 40,000 (the whole 
population) meets the standard required for ‘substance’ in the intent to commit the crime. 
Organised massacres of 20 percent of a group is a substantial, notable, considerable, 
significant proportion of that group.91 But in Jelisic, the accused explicitly stated his intention 
to destroy a much larger proportion of the entire ‘Bosnia Muslim’ group than it was assumed 
was intended in Srebrenica.92 Statements as to Jelisic’s intent suggest a special intention as 
strong, possibly considerably stronger, than those cited in Akayesu, and in terms of 
proportion or part of the protected group, considerably larger than the proportion considered 
relevant to the judgment of intent in Krstic regarding Srebrenica.93 
  
Regarding the ‘a representative fraction thereof’ or qualitative test raised in Jelisic, the 
Commission of Experts which investigated crimes committed during the war, specified that, 
 
 if essentially the total leadership of a group is targeted, it could also  
 amount to genocide.  Such leadership includes political and administrative  
 leaders, religious leaders, academics and intellectuals, business leaders  
 and others – the totality per se may be a strong indication of genocide  
 regardless of the actual numbers killed. A corroborating argument will be  
 the fate of the rest of the group. The character of the attack on the leadership  
 must be viewed in the context of the fate or what happened to the rest of the  
 group. If a group has its leadership exterminated, and at the same time or  
 in the wake of that, has a relatively large number of the members of the  
 group killed or subjected to other heinous acts, for example deported on  
 a large scale or forced to flee, the cluster of violations ought to be considered  
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 in its entirety in order to interpret the provisions of the Convention in a spirit 
 consistent with its purpose.94 
 
The Prosecutor in Jelisic tendered ‘lists of names of persons who were reputedly killed at the 
time of the acts ascribed to the accused...[including] a list of thirty-nine persons who for the 
most part were either members of the local administrative or political authorities, well-known 
figures in town, members of the Muslim Youth Association, members of the SDA or simply 
SDA  sympathisers.’95 The Chamber concluded that it was ‘not therefore possible to 
conclude beyond all reasonable doubt that the choice of victims arose from a precise logic to 
destroy the most representative figures of the Muslim community in Brcko to the point of 
threatening the survival of that community’.96 In a relatively small community such as Brcko, 
it would not be unreasonable to argue that 39 community, religious and political leaders 
could be seen as a qualitatively substantial proportion of the group, particularly if taken in 
conjunction with the murders of significant numbers of ordinary Bosnians, expulsion of a vast 
number or proportion, destruction of homes, religious building and other cultural artefacts, 
not only in Brcko municipality but across most non-Serb parts of Bosnia. A legal scholar 
noted for his acceptance of a narrow interpretation of the Convention has argued that in 
‘systematically kill[ing] Muslim inmates... the victims were essentially all of the Muslim 
community leaders...’97  
 
 
4  A Note on Other Genocide Jurisprudence 
Finally, it needs to be noted that other courts have adopted strikingly different interpretation 
of the Convention to that generally offered by judges at the ICTY. In Jorgic v Germany the 
European Court of Human Rights found that genocide had been committed in a case outside 
the Srebrenica municipality in the early months of the war (spring/summer 1992). Taking 
greater notice of scholarship on the war, it referenced the fact that, ‘a considerable number 
of scholars were of the opinion that the notion of destruction of a group as such, in its literal 
meaning, was wider than a physical-biological extermination and also encompassed the 
destruction of a group as a social unit’.98 The judges noted that the Trial Chamber in Krstic 
recognised that destruction of cultural and sociological characteristics of a human group 
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when allied to a wider physical or biological destruction, i.e., killing, it ‘may legitimately be 
considered as evidence of an intent to physically destroy the group’.99 
 
German courts have found that genocide took place in various regions of north and eastern 
Bosnia: in Foca municipality, in the Jorgic case in Doboj municipality, the Sokolovic case 
relating to acts committed in Kalesija municipality near Zvornik, and in Vrbanjci, north-central 
Bosnia, where Kusljic’s acts were understood as genocide. All of these cases relate to acts 
carried out mostly in the early months of the war in 1992. 
 
 
Conclusion 
There is a sense that not just legal institutions failed the test the Yugoslav crisis threw up in 
the early 1990s. The Cold War helped to inure actors or at least direct attention away from 
the war crimes and human rights horrors the world can throw up. The focus of this article has 
not been the individual states or international organisations. Neither is it civil society actors 
such as the international media that collectively failed to raise their game to address the 
particular challenge that was Bosnia. The focus has been the nascent international judiciary 
and it is clear that elements of the new international legal system may have developed in 
ways not unconnected to the wider failures to address the Yugoslav crisis in the most 
appropriate manner. 
 
The substantial crimes committed in Bosnia and the many thousands of victims who 
perished in the planned operation to expand Serbian control of territory where previously 
mixed populations lived together in effect destroying defenceless communities on those 
territories, can be contrasted to the ICTY record of conviction: only five men (out of 18 
indicted) for genocide, on charges relating only to one incident (out of many) of genocide. As 
noted above this record leaves many observers, from Bosnia and other neighbouring Balkan 
states, and from further afield, discontent with the justice offered by the Yugoslav Tribunal. 
The Jelisic case, as the detailed analysis above suggests, contributed to the narrowing 
interpretation of the Convention various other case decisions of both ad hoc tribunals have 
had. It seems plausible to argue, in this light therefore, the direction of the judiciary has been 
away from holding those who actually commit the crimes that constitute the actus reus of 
genocide responsible and arguably the effect has been to deny many thousands of victims 
and their surviving families – in particular regarding eastern Bosnia - the full sense of justice 
convictions for genocide arguably symbolise.  
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From the above analysis it is possible to argue that a judicial chasm  separates on the one 
hand the ad hoc tribunals and Bosnia’s own War Crimes Chamber – which has to date 
followed the line taken in The Hague – and on the other, certain national courts, in particular 
the German regional courts and the European Court of Human Rights. In addition, the 
overall contribution of this jurisprudence seems to not only contradict expert opinion of 
academics across a range of relevant disciplines in the humanities and social sciences – 
inscribing a potentially significant trans-disciplinary fault line in relation to genocide, the 
crime of crimes – but arguably also specifically undermines the contribution of historians and 
the proceedings of the courts themselves to a consolidated, accurate narrative of the 
Yugoslav wars. That said it is important to remember that without such a Tribunal, the region 
would have been left with even less a sense of justice and order than exists, somewhat 
precariously, today. 
 
This article raises questions for future research in law – on the specific legal conceptual and 
evidential issues discussed above – but in particular in relation to international judicial 
decision making in the development of case law: what factors have impacted, almost 
imperceptibly, on the methods, interpretive procedures and legal creativity of international 
judges? Precisely how does the media-driven sea of information (and the very language 
used to describe information) in which we all (including those remote figures, judges) swim, 
affect judicial appreciation of complex crises? In the light of the argument outlined above, 
such questions seem in need of urgent enquiry and response.  
 
